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This issue of the Bulletin is primarily based on an IDS
seminar series. The State of ¡he World Political
Economy. held in the summer term of 1984. We are
grateful to the five seminar speakers who so willingly
wrote up their presentations for this publication, and
to he three additional authors whose contributors
helped to complete this Bulletin.
Slowdown or Crisis? Editorial Introduction
David Evans and Raphael Kaplinsky
Introduction
By late October 1929 the Wall Street stock-market had
crashed, announcing to an astonished world that the
post-World War ¡ recovery was not quite as robust as
many public figures had appeared to beheve. This
accepted view that all was well in the US economy had
persisted right through the years of portent; indeed as
late as mid-September 1929 the Wall Street Journal
proclaimed that 'price movements in the main body of
stocks yesterday continued to display the
characteristics of a major advance temporarily halted
for technical readjustment'.' At this time of
uncertainty in global economic performance in the
l980s, it is therefore appropriate to exercise caution in
prognostications of future growth.
Public figures, for perfectly obvious reasons, have a
vested interest in allaying public concern and
massaging indicators of profound structural distur-
bance in economic and political systems. So how are
we to interpret the significance of current assessments
when we are often assured - as in the late 1920s that
economic recovery, whether short, medium or long-
run, is around the corner? To what extent is slowdown
and unemployment a sign of major structural
disequilibria?
Views on this matter are divided along a wide
continuum, perhaps reflecting the degree of incor-
poration of individual observers in the wider social
process. In this Bulletin we offer a range of views on the
topic - broad church, involving different levels of
discourse, and drawing alternative policy prescriptions.
The canvas is the world political economy which can
be roughly divided into three parts - the industrial
market economies. Eastern European non-market
economies, and the developing countries. For
simplicit, we will often refer to these groups as West.
East and South. This Bulletin focuses heavily on an
analysis of West, for inevitably the OECD economies
must be at the centre of the global stage. But at the
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same time much of the discussion makes reference to
developments and interreactions with South and East.
Before introducing the individual contributors we
offer a brief introduction to the major issues to those
readers who may feel less familiar with them. This
involves two sets of discussions, which largely for
reasons of space and professional specialisation,
display an economistic bias. First we chart the
performance of some key economic variables over
recent years. as a backdrop to the individual
discussions by the various contributors to this Bulletin.
Then we offer a brief statement of the two major
alternative perspectives which underlie these specific
contributions.
Slowdown
It is important to maintain a sense of historical
perspective on the quantitative dimensions in this
debate. Manifestly, despite long welfare queues and
persistent poverty in the US, Britain and elsewhere in
Europe, general standards of living in the West are at a
historical peak. This is evident from Table I, leading
Maddison to a characterisation of the post-World
War II period as the 'Golden Age' for the developed
economies (Table la). Bairoch's data (Table lb)
suggest that this surge in economic growth rates
applied equally to the Third World. Per capita income
also grew at unprecedented rates in this post-war
period, which was characterised by a growing
internationalisation of production as evidenced by the
higher growth of world trade compared with GDP
growth for all but 1913-50 (Table la).
Table 1
Historical rates of growth (1820-1979)
MADDISON ESTIMATES OF DC GROWTH RATES
Source: Maddison 1982. Table 4.9
BAIROCH ESTIMATES OF LDC GROWTH RATES
growth % pa
Source: Bairoch 1975, Tables 29 and 51. Export shares based
on rough averaging of point estimates.
In addition to this high rate of economic growth,
Table I points to a second important development,
that is the change in trend in the last 15 years or so. In
common with many commentators, Maddison dates
the downturn from around 1973, the year of the first
OPEC oil price rise. In presenting Maddison's data,
we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of this choice
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of year for the turning-point in bringing an end to the
'Golden Age'; as noted below, there were already
some important indicators heralding the end of the
'Golden Age' which turned downwards from the mid-
l960s. Had Maddison had access to more recent data,
in which growth rates have continued to decline and
when the volume of world trade actually fell in some
years, his period of 'blurred objectives' from 1973 to
1979 would probably have reflected a more deep-
seated trend (except for the very recent performance of
the USA whose durability, arguably remains uncertain;
[see Page 1984]. Does this extended period of 'blurred
objectives' reflect a structural disturbance, a tem-
porarily halted major advance?
An examination of the unemployment rates in
historical perspective shown in Table 2 provides some
insights. For most Western economies, the levels of
measured unemployment in the latter part of the l970s
were much closer to those of the 1930s, than the 1950s
and l960s. Indeed, for some, unemployment rates in
the late 1970s and early l980s exceeded those of the
l930s Depression. Further, as we can see from Tables
3 and 4, this rise in unemployment was associated with
a significant decline in the growth of labour
productivity - especially in the major OECD
economies - and a fall in the productivity of new
investment as reflected in the declining output-capital
ratios. The decline in output-capital ratios also
indicate, in the context ofa declining share of profit in
GDP, which also characterised the 1970s when
compared with the l960s, a declining rate of return on
capital invested, as documented in Hill [1979] for the
major Western economies. The slowdown in growth in
the East documented in Table 4 also implies a falling
output-capital ratio in the context of the widely
believed phenomenon of the continued excessively
high levels of investment in the major Eastern
European economies. The poor relative production
performance of the USA, the major post-World War
II lead-economy, is particularly noteworthy since the
recent massive capital inflows into the US, representing
an important component of contemporary economic
instability, effectively mask this continued weakness.2
lt is also important to bear in mind that in the whole of
the post-1945 period there is a striking negative
correlation between the proportion of GDP spent on
military activities, and the growth of GDP and
productivity [see de Grasse 1982, and Smith and Smith
19831.
2 BewIes, Gordon and Weisskopf [1983, appendix C), show that the
decline in LIS productivity growth rates first occurred in the 1966-73
period and thus preceded the emergence of more visible signs of
recession, serving to emphasise our point that the choice of decade
averages, or a particular year such as 1973, should not be taken to
prejudge the issue of when different turning points in different
indicators took place.
1820-1870
1870-1913
1913-50
1950-73
1973-79
GDP
per
capita
GD?
capital
stock
exports
2.2 1.0 (n.a.) 4.0
2.5 1.4 2.9 3.9
1.9 1.2 1.7 1.0
4.9 3.8 5.5 8.6
2.5 2.0 4.4 4.8
GDP per capita
GD?
share
world
exports
1900-13 2.1 1.2 .17
19 13-29 1.9 0.9 .21
1929-52/4 2.2 0.6 .28
1952/4- 1960 4.8 2.4 .23
1960- 1970 5.1 2.4 .19
Table 2
Unemployment rates in major OECD economies, 1933-81
Source: Freeman. Clark and Soete 1982
Table 3
Average annual growth rates of labour productivity
(GDP per man-hour)
Source: Freeman. Clark and Soete 1982
This decline in the economic performance of the
industrially-advanced Western and Eastern economies
over the 1970s was not immediately or so strongly
reflected in the performance of Southern economies.
Indeed, as can be seen from Table 4, whereas the
growth of per capita incomes in the South had been
lower than that of West and East during the decade of
the 1960s, their performance was relatively better, as
slowdown set-in in Western and Eastern economies in
the 1970s. Many factors explain this lagged impact,
including the greater robustness of the accumulation-
process in some of the NICs in which underlying
patterns of social relations continued to provide the
backdrop required for sustained growth, and the
changing geographical focus of world production
from North America to South East Asia. But it also
reflected the recycling of petrodollars through the
commercial banking system and the rapid growth of
Ide debt as shown in Table 5. As is now well-known,
this debt-problem is one of the major latent sources of
political and economic instability in the current
period, which could potentially trigger a descent from
slowdown into crisis, if indeed it is the former state
which characterises the contemporary global economy.
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1933 1959-67 1973 1977 1979 1981
Belgium 10.6 2.4 2.9 7.8 8.7 12.9
Denmark 14.5 1.4 0.7 5.8 5.3 9.5
France na 0.7 1.8 4.8 6.0 8.9
Germany 14.8 1.2 1.0 4.0 3.4 6.7
Ireland na 4.6 5.6 9.2 7.5 11.5
Italy 5.9 6.2 4.9 6.4 7.5 9.6
Japan na 1.4 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.2
Netherlands 9.7 0.9 2.3 4.1 4.1 10.2
UK 13.9 1.8 2.5 5.7 5.8 11.3
USA 20.5 5.3 4.9 7.0 5.8 8.9
1870-1913 1913-50 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1973-80
France 1.8 '.7 4.3 5.1 3.8 3.7
Germany 1.9 1.2 6.6 5.2 3.6 3.2
Italy 1.2 1.8 4.3 6.3 2.5 1.7
Japan 1.8 1.4 5.7 9.6 4.3 2.6
UK 1.1 1.5 2.3 3.2 2.4 1.6
USA 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.5 0.8
Table 4
Source: World Bank 1984, Annex Tables 2, 5,21 and text Table 3.1
Notes: estimate from Brus [19841
1 1960 share
1982 share
1981-85 plans; estimate from Brus [1984]
Output capital ratio given by GD? growth x investment share
or change in GD? GDP change in GDP
GDP investment investment
average of low and high projections and unweighted averages of sub-groups of countries
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Growth indicators 1960-82
1960-70
growth % pa
GD? per
worker
GD?
investment
share in
GD?2
output
capital
ratio5
1970-82
growth % pa
GD? per
worker
GD?
investment
share in
GDP3
output
capital
ratio5
4.5 2.8 .19 .24 4.5 2.5 .24 .19
6.0 3.9 .20 .30 5.4 3.0 .24 .23
16.7 12.9 na na 5.0 0.5 .26 .19
5.1 3.9 .21 .24 2.8 1.6 .20 .14
4.3 2.5 .19 .23 2.7 1.0 .16 .17
10.4 8,5 .33 .32 4.6 3.3 .30 .15
7.0' 6.2 na na 5.01 3.9 na na
Low income
economies
Middle income
economies
High income oil
exporters
Industrial market
economies
USA
Japan
East European
non-market
economies
Table 5
Debt indicators for developing countries, 1970-83
(per cent)
Note: calculations are based on a sample ot 90 developing countries.
estimated
rano of Interest payments plus amortisation to exports
Source: World Bank 1954:3 I
Given this backdrop of evolving economic per-
formance over the last two decades, it is possible to
discern two major alternative frameworks of analysis
which tend to inform the various contributors to this
Bulletin. It is important to bear these alternative
frameworks in mind when assessing the various
analytical explanations offered and prescriptive
programmes advocated or implied for reversing
slowdown and averting crisis.
Crisis?
As this post-1970 slowdown persisted, simplistic
explanations have given way to more considered and
complex assessments. Thus, initially it was fashionable
to explain this slowdown as a consequence of the 1973
and 1979 oil price rises, the effects of the latter
becoming sharper due to a public policy switch from
full employment to inflation-containment objectives.
More recently, especially as slowdown has persisted in
the face of a decline in real oil prices, other public
policy explanations or contributing factors have been
widely discussed. Obvious examples are destabilising
government monetary and fiscal policy such as the
effects of short-run US macroeconomic policies on the
rest-of-the-world, rising state expenditure, the rise of
protectionism in the West, and labour market
rigidities. These explanations have usually been
presented in terms of market inefficiency and distorted
market incentives, particularly with respect to the
operation of the labour market and protectionism.
(For an excellent summary of conventional wisdom on
these matters, see World Bank [1984, ch 2].)
Yet there remains a substantial body of opinion which
places rather less confidence in the ability of the world
economy to regain its former vitality. It is therefore
pertinent to ask if there is any sense in which it is useful
or helpful to talk about the world political economy as
being in a state of 'crisis', an approach which lies in
sharp contrast to the more sanguine perspectives
mentioned above. Many will worry that the term
'crisis' is simply an unhelpful buzz-word used by the
prophets of doom. With its implicit connotations of
'collapse', it is considered to endanger inaction, and
therefore to hold little promise for constructive policy
prescription. However, this approach tends to reduce
analyses of crisis to an emotional outcry and does
scant justice to a long history of economic and
political analysis.
In its original meaning, crisis meant 'decision'; in more
general usage, it often refers to a turning point, such as
in the course of an illness. In 19th century political
economy usage, 'crisis' often meant the turning-points
of the trade cycle, turning points which also brought
with them painful moments of decision because of the
bankruptcies often associated with the downturn or
collapse in economic activity, or euphoric moments of
new investment decisions which heralded the upturn.
Within the mainstream of economic analysis, 19th
century crisis theory gave way to business cycle theory
in the 20th century. After the Bolshevik Revolution
and emergence of the Soviet Union, the term 'crisis'
began to lose its serious political economy meaning
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indica fors 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 /981 1982 1983
Ratio of debt to GNP 13.3 14.0 15.4 16.6 18.1 19.3 19.5 19.2 21.9 24.9 26.7
Ratio of debt to exports 99.4 63.7 76.4 79.6 84.7 92.9 83.7 76.1 90.8 108.7 121.4
Debt service ratio2 13.5 9.5 11.1 10.9 12.1 15.4 15.0 13.6 16.6 19.9 20.7
Ratio of interest
service to GNP 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.2
Total debt outstanding
and disbursed
(billions of dollars) 68.4 141.0 168.6 203.8 249.8 311.7 368.8 424.8 482.6 538.0 595.8
Official 33.5 61.2 71.6 83.5 99.8 120.1 136.0 157.5 172.3 190.9 208.5
Private 34.9 79.8 96.9 120.3 150.0 191.6 232.8 267.3 310.3 347.1 387.3
and was increasingly applied as one of several key
terms of abuse in Soviet criticism of capitalism as a
social system. However since the 1960s, the term
'crisis' has reappeared in a number of different
contexts. In the latter l960s and early 1970s, it was
often fashionable to refer to 'crisis' in planning, in aid
to developing countries, in the ecosystem, or many
other areas where analysts felt there was a need for
urgent and decisive public policy action to further the
cause of development, however narrowly or broadly
defined. (The second Brandt Commission Report,
Common Crisis, published in 1983 best exemplifies this
tradition). More recently, the international banking
community and the world financial press have used
the term 'crisis' in the context of the discussion of
international debt. Here, 'crisis' is much closer to the
19th century political economy context, where it is
clearly associated with threatened bankruptcy and
collapse of the international financial system because
of potential default of sovereign debtors in the Third
World. Here, 'moments of decision' as a result of
slowdown threaten not just the bankruptcy of
individuals and firms, but the bankrupcy of sovereign
states and the social and political systems which
underpin them - a problem not confined to the Third
World, but also found in some Eastern European
countries and, potentially, even the developed
capitalist countries themselves. Moreover, the onset of
the New Cold War heralds a sharpening of a
civilisational crisis, given the accelerating potential for
mutual self-destruction as a result ofa threatening new
nuclear arms race.
As editors, we welcome careful and appropriate usage
of the term 'crisis', though, as will be clear from the
articles in this issue, it remains a contentious matter.
At issue is an appropriate way of taking account of the
current slowdown on the rate of economic growth in
the global economy. For, given the multifaceted and
interlocking sets of 'disturbances' which find
expression in all parts of the world political-economy,
it is clearly important that a viewpoint is adopted on
these contemporary developments. The 'crisis school'
suggests that the 'turning point' - that is the
resolution of the major structural disequilibria which
are more profound than common business cycles -
requires some sort of change in patterns of social
relations. In this sense, many of the policy
prescriptions currently on offer (reflation with a
reduction in interest rates, cuts in government
expenditure, and so on) fail to recognise the wider
social and political determinants of economic
behaviour. Whether this discussion takes the form of
changing patterns of best-practice production systems
or the use of state power to override market forces is
less important than the fact that these perspectives on
crisis share a common recognition of the more
profound social and political roots of the economic
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slowdown. In contrast the slowdown perspective
defines the problem principally in terms of markets,
with the attendant imperfections finding ready
prescription in appropriate interventions designed to
facilitate a spontaneous resolution of slowdown
through the market mechanism.
This divide is consequently reflected in different
perspectives on the appropriate forms of policy
intervention in response to slowdown. Those who
consider that the problem represents temporary
economic disequilibria tend to favour market
solutions with limited state intervention. On the other
hand, those who identify in slowdown deeper
structural causes with powerful social and political
dimensions, tend to see the resolution of 'crisis' in
broader social and political terms. In this perspective,
the agenda for state or other policy action will be much
broader and more varied.
About this Bulletin
The first three articles in this issue might be said to be
characterised by a market orientated perspective.
Martin Wolf represents a broadly monetarist version
of this approach. He examines the interrelationship
between the Third World debt problem and between
trade, on the one hand, and the balance between
output and expenditure on the other. He argues that
the most helpful resolution of the debt problem lies in
the combination of restored economic growth in the
developed Western economies and a reversal of recent
trends towards increasing market inefficiency, parti-
cularly protectionism. His principal policy conclusion
is that a major initiative towards trade liberalisation is
required to facilitate the trade adjustments which must
go hand in hand with the resolution of the debt crisis.
Patrick Minford also represents a monetarist version
of the market orientated approach. He argues that the
major short-run cause of disturbance in the world
economy in the 1980s has been US macroeconomic
policy. He suggests that the elimination of this source
of distortion and instability from the world economy
by reducing US budget deficits, coupled with other
reforms to eliminate market inefficiency, particularly
labour market distortions, will provide the best hope
for the regeneration of long-run growth through the
market mechanism. In line with the New Classical
economics, he concludes that government attempts to
reduce unemployment through reflation will be
self-defeating.
Charles Harvey reports on a detailed case-study
analysis of the performance ofa number of developing
economies as welt as their policy framework in the
post-1979 period, using a broadly structuralist
approach to the operation of markets in developing
countries. He concludes that, whilst the particular
policies of different developing countries, such as
commitments to major structural change, food
subsidies and energy-cheap policies, may often hinder
adjustment to the changes in the world economy, the
overwhelming need is for policy changes in the
developed Western economies themselves to restore
growth. In the absence of such policy changes, he
argues for a modest reduction in Southern countries'
dependence on trade with the developed West and a
switch to South-South trade, without holding much
hope that such a switch on its own would have much to
offer to the poorest.
In contrast to these market-orientated 'slowdown'
perspectives, the remaining contributions to this
Bulletin argue that a resumption of former high
growth and employment patterns will necessarily be
associated with significant changes in the social and
political complexion of societies beneath the
'appearances' of the market. They do not argue that
markets are unimportant, but assert that the
understanding of market forces must be interpreted in
a wider social context. Inevitably, although sharing
this common perception of the current economic
environment, the analytical bases of their analyses
differ widely. Moreover, unlike each of the market-
orientated contributions who consciously set them-
selves the task of suggesting particular policy
prescriptions, the 'crisis' group argue the case at
different levels of abstraction, some of which make
little pretence of offering specific policy proposals.
Andrew Brody offers a historical perspective on
slowdown and crisis in a provocative and stimulating
synopsis of his forthcoming book, Slowdown: about
our economic maladies. He argues that it is the
coincidence of a number of cyclical factors -
including demographic changes, investment cycles
(including energy) and a slowdown in innovation -
which underlies the current 'malaise of the millenium'.
He does not deny the power of markets, but rather
argues that the market processes are very imperfect
and over-correcting. In his view, it is the growth of an
overweening state and the vast and spiralling
resources devoted to weapons of mass destruction
which pose a threat to life on earth and therefore a
crisis for mankind.
Carlotta Perez focuses on the specific technological
and social patterns which underlie long waves of
economic growth. Crisis, in her analysis, emerges
when there is a 'serious mismatch between the (new)
techno-economic sub-systems and the (old) socio-
institutional framework'. In this particular phase of
history the old social framework was geared to large-
scale mass-production based upon cheap energy and
dispersed patterns of location. This conflicts with the
new era in which social and productive organisations
are smaller in scale and more flexible in nature.
Robin Murray focuses on the role of the state in the
current economic crisis, in this case, the role of the
Greater London Council as seen by the governing
Labour Group. As such his contribution is much the
most policy-oriented of this latter group of analyses.
For Murray, active intervention by the state represents
one way of countering the current crisis which has left
400,000 of London's population unemployed, with
growing poverty and a continuation of de-industriali-
sation. The state - in this case the GLC - by acting
'in the interests of labour rather than capital',
intervenes directly in production to facilitate techno-
logical restructuring, based upon participation by the
labour force.
Arthur MacEwan focuses on the interaction between
crisis and the expansion and latter-day contraction of
the global activities of American MNCs. In particular
he argues that the organisational structures (of the
MNCs) established to operate in their period of rapid
growth appear now to be inappropriate to the new
situation of instability. He argues that economic crisis
did not emerge either because of bad luck or bad
policy but rather as a direct consequence of the
particular MNC-based mode of expansion in the post-
war period. However, whilst neither adopting a
position arguing the inevitability of economic
collapse, nor offering a set of proposals to resolve
current difficulties. MacEwan concludes by casting
doubt on current policy initiatives to re-industrialise
the US economy.
Ferenc Miszlivetz and Mary Kaldor take up the theme
of civilisational crisis introduced by Andrew Brody,
widening the discussion from its narrower economic
and political dimensions. They argue that the nation-
state systems upon which the world economy is built
require for their survival the reassertion of nationalism
at ever higher levels, expressed most recently in the
New Cold War between East and West. On the other
hand, continued internationalisation of the world
economy in the post-war period threatens and
undermines the traditional geographical and political
units and concepts. This undermining process has
radically accelerated in recent decades with the arrival
of modern nuclear and microelectronic technologies
with their capacity to destroy civilisation itself. They
argue that the resolution of crisis must be sought in the
realm of social relations, suggesting that one of the
many levels at which this struggle for change must be
carried out is through such anti-systemic grass-roots
activities as the new West and East European peace
movements.
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As editors we make no attempt to adjudge the relative
merits or demerits of either school, nor of individual
contributors. There are many obvious gaps, and not
all the interconnections of the papers have been drawn
out. This is the task of the reader, and we hope that the
contributions contained in this issue will assist in this
judgement and serve to stimulate discussion.
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